0,0 → 1,4381 |
/* |
* SSLv3/TLSv1 server-side functions |
* |
* Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved |
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 |
* |
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by |
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or |
* (at your option) any later version. |
* |
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
* GNU General Public License for more details. |
* |
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along |
* with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., |
* 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. |
* |
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) |
*/ |
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) |
#include "mbedtls/config.h" |
#else |
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE |
#endif |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) |
#include "mbedtls/platform.h" |
#else |
#include <stdlib.h> |
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc |
#define mbedtls_free free |
#endif |
|
#include "mbedtls/debug.h" |
#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" |
#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" |
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" |
|
#include <string.h> |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) |
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" |
#endif |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) |
#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" |
#endif |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) |
int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
const unsigned char *info, |
size_t ilen ) |
{ |
if( ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
|
mbedtls_free( ssl->cli_id ); |
|
if( ( ssl->cli_id = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ilen ) ) == NULL ) |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); |
|
memcpy( ssl->cli_id, info, ilen ); |
ssl->cli_id_len = ilen; |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, |
mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write, |
mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check, |
void *p_cookie ) |
{ |
conf->f_cookie_write = f_cookie_write; |
conf->f_cookie_check = f_cookie_check; |
conf->p_cookie = p_cookie; |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) |
static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
const unsigned char *buf, |
size_t len ) |
{ |
int ret; |
size_t servername_list_size, hostname_len; |
const unsigned char *p; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "parse ServerName extension" ) ); |
|
if( len < 2 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
servername_list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) ); |
if( servername_list_size + 2 != len ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
p = buf + 2; |
while( servername_list_size > 2 ) |
{ |
hostname_len = ( ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2] ); |
if( hostname_len + 3 > servername_list_size ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME ) |
{ |
ret = ssl->conf->f_sni( ssl->conf->p_sni, |
ssl, p + 3, hostname_len ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_sni_wrapper", ret ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
servername_list_size -= hostname_len + 3; |
p += hostname_len + 3; |
} |
|
if( servername_list_size != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ |
|
static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
const unsigned char *buf, |
size_t len ) |
{ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) |
{ |
/* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */ |
if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len || |
buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len || |
mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data, |
ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ |
{ |
if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; |
} |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) |
|
/* |
* Status of the implementation of signature-algorithms extension: |
* |
* Currently, we are only considering the signature-algorithm extension |
* to pick a ciphersuite which allows us to send the ServerKeyExchange |
* message with a signature-hash combination that the user allows. |
* |
* We do *not* check whether all certificates in our certificate |
* chain are signed with an allowed signature-hash pair. |
* This needs to be done at a later stage. |
* |
*/ |
static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
const unsigned char *buf, |
size_t len ) |
{ |
size_t sig_alg_list_size; |
|
const unsigned char *p; |
const unsigned char *end = buf + len; |
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_cur; |
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_cur; |
|
if ( len < 2 ) { |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
sig_alg_list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) ); |
if( sig_alg_list_size + 2 != len || |
sig_alg_list_size % 2 != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
/* Currently we only guarantee signing the ServerKeyExchange message according |
* to the constraints specified in this extension (see above), so it suffices |
* to remember only one suitable hash for each possible signature algorithm. |
* |
* This will change when we also consider certificate signatures, |
* in which case we will need to remember the whole signature-hash |
* pair list from the extension. |
*/ |
|
for( p = buf + 2; p < end; p += 2 ) |
{ |
/* Silently ignore unknown signature or hash algorithms. */ |
|
if( ( sig_cur = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( p[1] ) ) == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext" |
" unknown sig alg encoding %d", p[1] ) ); |
continue; |
} |
|
/* Check if we support the hash the user proposes */ |
md_cur = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( p[0] ); |
if( md_cur == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:" |
" unknown hash alg encoding %d", p[0] ) ); |
continue; |
} |
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, md_cur ) == 0 ) |
{ |
mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_cur, md_cur ); |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:" |
" match sig %d and hash %d", |
sig_cur, md_cur ) ); |
} |
else |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: " |
"hash alg %d not supported", md_cur ) ); |
} |
} |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && |
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
static int ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
const unsigned char *buf, |
size_t len ) |
{ |
size_t list_size, our_size; |
const unsigned char *p; |
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info, **curves; |
|
if ( len < 2 ) { |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) ); |
if( list_size + 2 != len || |
list_size % 2 != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
/* Should never happen unless client duplicates the extension */ |
if( ssl->handshake->curves != NULL ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
/* Don't allow our peer to make us allocate too much memory, |
* and leave room for a final 0 */ |
our_size = list_size / 2 + 1; |
if( our_size > MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX ) |
our_size = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX; |
|
if( ( curves = mbedtls_calloc( our_size, sizeof( *curves ) ) ) == NULL ) |
{ |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); |
} |
|
ssl->handshake->curves = curves; |
|
p = buf + 2; |
while( list_size > 0 && our_size > 1 ) |
{ |
curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1] ); |
|
if( curve_info != NULL ) |
{ |
*curves++ = curve_info; |
our_size--; |
} |
|
list_size -= 2; |
p += 2; |
} |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
const unsigned char *buf, |
size_t len ) |
{ |
size_t list_size; |
const unsigned char *p; |
|
if( len == 0 || (size_t)( buf[0] + 1 ) != len ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
list_size = buf[0]; |
|
p = buf + 1; |
while( list_size > 0 ) |
{ |
if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || |
p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ) |
{ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) |
ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; |
#endif |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0]; |
#endif |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) ); |
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
list_size--; |
p++; |
} |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || |
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
const unsigned char *buf, |
size_t len ) |
{ |
int ret; |
|
if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) ); |
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, |
buf, len ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
/* Only mark the extension as OK when we're sure it is */ |
ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK; |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) |
static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
const unsigned char *buf, |
size_t len ) |
{ |
if( len != 1 || buf[0] >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code = buf[0]; |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) |
static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
const unsigned char *buf, |
size_t len ) |
{ |
if( len != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
((void) buf); |
|
if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED ) |
ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) |
static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
const unsigned char *buf, |
size_t len ) |
{ |
if( len != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
((void) buf); |
|
if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED && |
ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) |
{ |
ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; |
} |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) |
static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
const unsigned char *buf, |
size_t len ) |
{ |
if( len != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
((void) buf); |
|
if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED && |
ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) |
{ |
ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; |
} |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
unsigned char *buf, |
size_t len ) |
{ |
int ret; |
mbedtls_ssl_session session; |
|
mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session ); |
|
if( ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse == NULL || |
ssl->conf->f_ticket_write == NULL ) |
{ |
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
/* Remember the client asked us to send a new ticket */ |
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %d", len ) ); |
|
if( len == 0 ) |
return( 0 ); |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket rejected: renegotiating" ) ); |
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ |
|
/* |
* Failures are ok: just ignore the ticket and proceed. |
*/ |
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse( ssl->conf->p_ticket, &session, |
buf, len ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session ); |
|
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket is not authentic" ) ); |
else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED ) |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket is expired" ) ); |
else |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse", ret ); |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
/* |
* Keep the session ID sent by the client, since we MUST send it back to |
* inform them we're accepting the ticket (RFC 5077 section 3.4) |
*/ |
session.id_len = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; |
memcpy( &session.id, ssl->session_negotiate->id, session.id_len ); |
|
mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); |
memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate, &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); |
|
/* Zeroize instead of free as we copied the content */ |
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from ticket" ) ); |
|
ssl->handshake->resume = 1; |
|
/* Don't send a new ticket after all, this one is OK */ |
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) |
static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) |
{ |
size_t list_len, cur_len, ours_len; |
const unsigned char *theirs, *start, *end; |
const char **ours; |
|
/* If ALPN not configured, just ignore the extension */ |
if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL ) |
return( 0 ); |
|
/* |
* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; |
* |
* struct { |
* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> |
* } ProtocolNameList; |
*/ |
|
/* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */ |
if( len < 4 ) |
{ |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; |
if( list_len != len - 2 ) |
{ |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
/* |
* Validate peer's list (lengths) |
*/ |
start = buf + 2; |
end = buf + len; |
for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len ) |
{ |
cur_len = *theirs++; |
|
/* Current identifier must fit in list */ |
if( cur_len > (size_t)( end - theirs ) ) |
{ |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
/* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */ |
if( cur_len == 0 ) |
{ |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
} |
|
/* |
* Use our order of preference |
*/ |
for( ours = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *ours != NULL; ours++ ) |
{ |
ours_len = strlen( *ours ); |
for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len ) |
{ |
cur_len = *theirs++; |
|
if( cur_len == ours_len && |
memcmp( theirs, *ours, cur_len ) == 0 ) |
{ |
ssl->alpn_chosen = *ours; |
return( 0 ); |
} |
} |
} |
|
/* If we get there, no match was found */ |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ |
|
/* |
* Auxiliary functions for ServerHello parsing and related actions |
*/ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) |
/* |
* Return 0 if the given key uses one of the acceptable curves, -1 otherwise |
*/ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) |
static int ssl_check_key_curve( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, |
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves ) |
{ |
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **crv = curves; |
mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id; |
|
while( *crv != NULL ) |
{ |
if( (*crv)->grp_id == grp_id ) |
return( 0 ); |
crv++; |
} |
|
return( -1 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ |
|
/* |
* Try picking a certificate for this ciphersuite, |
* return 0 on success and -1 on failure. |
*/ |
static int ssl_pick_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * ciphersuite_info ) |
{ |
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list, *fallback = NULL; |
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = |
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ); |
uint32_t flags; |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) |
if( ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL ) |
list = ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert; |
else |
#endif |
list = ssl->conf->key_cert; |
|
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) |
return( 0 ); |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite requires certificate" ) ); |
|
if( list == NULL ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server has no certificate" ) ); |
return( -1 ); |
} |
|
for( cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate", |
cur->cert ); |
|
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &cur->cert->pk, pk_alg ) ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: key type" ) ); |
continue; |
} |
|
/* |
* This avoids sending the client a cert it'll reject based on |
* keyUsage or other extensions. |
* |
* It also allows the user to provision different certificates for |
* different uses based on keyUsage, eg if they want to avoid signing |
* and decrypting with the same RSA key. |
*/ |
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( cur->cert, ciphersuite_info, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &flags ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: " |
"(extended) key usage extension" ) ); |
continue; |
} |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) |
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && |
ssl_check_key_curve( &cur->cert->pk, ssl->handshake->curves ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: elliptic curve" ) ); |
continue; |
} |
#endif |
|
/* |
* Try to select a SHA-1 certificate for pre-1.2 clients, but still |
* present them a SHA-higher cert rather than failing if it's the only |
* one we got that satisfies the other conditions. |
*/ |
if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && |
cur->cert->sig_md != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) |
{ |
if( fallback == NULL ) |
fallback = cur; |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate not preferred: " |
"sha-2 with pre-TLS 1.2 client" ) ); |
continue; |
} |
} |
|
/* If we get there, we got a winner */ |
break; |
} |
|
if( cur == NULL ) |
cur = fallback; |
|
/* Do not update ssl->handshake->key_cert unless there is a match */ |
if( cur != NULL ) |
{ |
ssl->handshake->key_cert = cur; |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "selected certificate chain, certificate", |
ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert ); |
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
return( -1 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ |
|
/* |
* Check if a given ciphersuite is suitable for use with our config/keys/etc |
* Sets ciphersuite_info only if the suite matches. |
*/ |
static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, |
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **ciphersuite_info ) |
{ |
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info; |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) |
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_type; |
#endif |
|
suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( suite_id ); |
if( suite_info == NULL ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "trying ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) ); |
|
if( suite_info->min_minor_ver > ssl->minor_ver || |
suite_info->max_minor_ver < ssl->minor_ver ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: version" ) ); |
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && |
( suite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS ) ) |
return( 0 ); |
#endif |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) |
if( ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED && |
suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: rc4" ) ); |
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && |
( ssl->handshake->cli_exts & MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK ) == 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: ecjpake " |
"not configured or ext missing" ) ); |
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif |
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) |
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( suite_info ) && |
( ssl->handshake->curves == NULL || |
ssl->handshake->curves[0] == NULL ) ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: " |
"no common elliptic curve" ) ); |
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) |
/* If the ciphersuite requires a pre-shared key and we don't |
* have one, skip it now rather than failing later */ |
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) && |
ssl->conf->f_psk == NULL && |
( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL || |
ssl->conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || ssl->conf->psk_len == 0 ) ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared key" ) ); |
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) |
/* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether |
* a suitable hash algorithm is present. */ |
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) |
{ |
sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( suite_info ); |
if( sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && |
mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_type ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm " |
"for signature algorithm %d", sig_type ) ); |
return( 0 ); |
} |
} |
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && |
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) |
/* |
* Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a |
* certificate/key of a particular type: |
* - select the appropriate certificate if we have one, or |
* - try the next ciphersuite if we don't |
* This must be done last since we modify the key_cert list. |
*/ |
if( ssl_pick_cert( ssl, suite_info ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: " |
"no suitable certificate" ) ); |
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif |
|
*ciphersuite_info = suite_info; |
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) |
static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
{ |
int ret, got_common_suite; |
unsigned int i, j; |
size_t n; |
unsigned int ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len; |
unsigned char *buf, *p; |
const int *ciphersuites; |
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client hello v2" ) ); |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client hello v2 illegal for renegotiation" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ |
|
buf = ssl->in_hdr; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, 5 ); |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, message type: %d", |
buf[2] ) ); |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, message len.: %d", |
( ( buf[0] & 0x7F ) << 8 ) | buf[1] ) ); |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, max. version: [%d:%d]", |
buf[3], buf[4] ) ); |
|
/* |
* SSLv2 Client Hello |
* |
* Record layer: |
* 0 . 1 message length |
* |
* SSL layer: |
* 2 . 2 message type |
* 3 . 4 protocol version |
*/ |
if( buf[2] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO || |
buf[3] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
n = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1] ) & 0x7FFF; |
|
if( n < 17 || n > 512 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
ssl->major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; |
ssl->minor_ver = ( buf[4] <= ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) |
? buf[4] : ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; |
|
if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client only supports ssl smaller than minimum" |
" [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", |
ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, |
ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) ); |
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); |
} |
|
ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = buf[3]; |
ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = buf[4]; |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, 2 + n ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, buf + 2, n ); |
|
buf = ssl->in_msg; |
n = ssl->in_left - 5; |
|
/* |
* 0 . 1 ciphersuitelist length |
* 2 . 3 session id length |
* 4 . 5 challenge length |
* 6 . .. ciphersuitelist |
* .. . .. session id |
* .. . .. challenge |
*/ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record contents", buf, n ); |
|
ciph_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; |
sess_len = ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3]; |
chal_len = ( buf[4] << 8 ) | buf[5]; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciph_len: %d, sess_len: %d, chal_len: %d", |
ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len ) ); |
|
/* |
* Make sure each parameter length is valid |
*/ |
if( ciph_len < 3 || ( ciph_len % 3 ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
if( sess_len > 32 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
if( chal_len < 8 || chal_len > 32 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
if( n != 6 + ciph_len + sess_len + chal_len ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", |
buf + 6, ciph_len ); |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", |
buf + 6 + ciph_len, sess_len ); |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, challenge", |
buf + 6 + ciph_len + sess_len, chal_len ); |
|
p = buf + 6 + ciph_len; |
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len; |
memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, |
sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) ); |
memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, p, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); |
|
p += sess_len; |
memset( ssl->handshake->randbytes, 0, 64 ); |
memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32 - chal_len, p, chal_len ); |
|
/* |
* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV |
*/ |
for( i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3 ) |
{ |
if( p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0 && p[2] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO " ) ); |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received RENEGOTIATION SCSV " |
"during renegotiation" ) ); |
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ |
ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; |
break; |
} |
} |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) |
for( i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3 ) |
{ |
if( p[0] == 0 && |
p[1] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE >> 8 ) & 0xff ) && |
p[2] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) & 0xff ) ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); |
|
if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inapropriate fallback" ) ); |
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK ); |
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
break; |
} |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ |
|
got_common_suite = 0; |
ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; |
ciphersuite_info = NULL; |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) |
for( j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3 ) |
for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) |
#else |
for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) |
for( j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3 ) |
#endif |
{ |
if( p[0] != 0 || |
p[1] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) || |
p[2] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] ) & 0xFF ) ) |
continue; |
|
got_common_suite = 1; |
|
if( ( ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match( ssl, ciphersuites[i], |
&ciphersuite_info ) ) != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
|
if( ciphersuite_info != NULL ) |
goto have_ciphersuite_v2; |
} |
|
if( got_common_suite ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got ciphersuites in common, " |
"but none of them usable" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE ); |
} |
else |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no ciphersuites in common" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN ); |
} |
|
have_ciphersuite_v2: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name ) ); |
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; |
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; |
|
/* |
* SSLv2 Client Hello relevant renegotiation security checks |
*/ |
if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && |
ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
ssl->in_left = 0; |
ssl->state++; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client hello v2" ) ); |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ |
|
/* This function doesn't alert on errors that happen early during |
ClientHello parsing because they might indicate that the client is |
not talking SSL/TLS at all and would not understand our alert. */ |
static int ssl_parse_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
{ |
int ret, got_common_suite; |
size_t i, j; |
size_t ciph_offset, comp_offset, ext_offset; |
size_t msg_len, ciph_len, sess_len, comp_len, ext_len; |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
size_t cookie_offset, cookie_len; |
#endif |
unsigned char *buf, *p, *ext; |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
int renegotiation_info_seen = 0; |
#endif |
int handshake_failure = 0; |
const int *ciphersuites; |
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; |
int major, minor; |
|
/* If there is no signature-algorithm extension present, |
* we need to fall back to the default values for allowed |
* signature-hash pairs. */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) |
int sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 0; |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && |
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client hello" ) ); |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) |
read_record_header: |
#endif |
/* |
* If renegotiating, then the input was read with mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), |
* otherwise read it ourselves manually in order to support SSLv2 |
* ClientHello, which doesn't use the same record layer format. |
*/ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) |
#endif |
{ |
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, 5 ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
/* No alert on a read error. */ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
} |
|
buf = ssl->in_hdr; |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ) |
#endif |
if( ( buf[0] & 0x80 ) != 0 ) |
return( ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( ssl ) ); |
#endif |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) ); |
|
/* |
* SSLv3/TLS Client Hello |
* |
* Record layer: |
* 0 . 0 message type |
* 1 . 2 protocol version |
* 3 . 11 DTLS: epoch + record sequence number |
* 3 . 4 message length |
*/ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, message type: %d", |
buf[0] ) ); |
|
if( buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, message len.: %d", |
( ssl->in_len[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_len[1] ) ); |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, protocol version: [%d:%d]", |
buf[1], buf[2] ) ); |
|
mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major, &minor, ssl->conf->transport, buf + 1 ); |
|
/* According to RFC 5246 Appendix E.1, the version here is typically |
* "{03,00}, the lowest version number supported by the client, [or] the |
* value of ClientHello.client_version", so the only meaningful check here |
* is the major version shouldn't be less than 3 */ |
if( major < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
/* For DTLS if this is the initial handshake, remember the client sequence |
* number to use it in our next message (RFC 6347 4.2.1) */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
&& ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE |
#endif |
) |
{ |
/* Epoch should be 0 for initial handshakes */ |
if( ssl->in_ctr[0] != 0 || ssl->in_ctr[1] != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, ssl->in_ctr + 2, 6 ); |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) |
if( mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( ssl ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record, discarding" ) ); |
ssl->next_record_offset = 0; |
ssl->in_left = 0; |
goto read_record_header; |
} |
|
/* No MAC to check yet, so we can update right now */ |
mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( ssl ); |
#endif |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ |
|
msg_len = ( ssl->in_len[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_len[1]; |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) |
{ |
/* Set by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */ |
msg_len = ssl->in_hslen; |
} |
else |
#endif |
{ |
if( msg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, |
mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + msg_len ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
/* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) |
ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ); |
else |
#endif |
ssl->in_left = 0; |
} |
|
buf = ssl->in_msg; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record contents", buf, msg_len ); |
|
ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, buf, msg_len ); |
|
/* |
* Handshake layer: |
* 0 . 0 handshake type |
* 1 . 3 handshake length |
* 4 . 5 DTLS only: message seqence number |
* 6 . 8 DTLS only: fragment offset |
* 9 . 11 DTLS only: fragment length |
*/ |
if( msg_len < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, handshake type: %d", buf[0] ) ); |
|
if( buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, handshake len.: %d", |
( buf[1] << 16 ) | ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3] ) ); |
|
/* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */ |
if( buf[1] != 0 || |
msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + ( ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3] ) ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) |
{ |
/* |
* Copy the client's handshake message_seq on initial handshakes, |
* check sequence number on renego. |
*/ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) |
{ |
/* This couldn't be done in ssl_prepare_handshake_record() */ |
unsigned int cli_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | |
ssl->in_msg[5]; |
|
if( cli_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message_seq: " |
"%d (expected %d)", cli_msg_seq, |
ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq++; |
} |
else |
#endif |
{ |
unsigned int cli_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | |
ssl->in_msg[5]; |
ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq; |
ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq + 1; |
} |
|
/* |
* For now we don't support fragmentation, so make sure |
* fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length |
*/ |
if( ssl->in_msg[6] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[7] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[8] != 0 || |
memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 1, ssl->in_msg + 9, 3 ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ClientHello fragmentation not supported" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); |
} |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ |
|
buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); |
msg_len -= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); |
|
/* |
* ClientHello layer: |
* 0 . 1 protocol version |
* 2 . 33 random bytes (starting with 4 bytes of Unix time) |
* 34 . 35 session id length (1 byte) |
* 35 . 34+x session id |
* 35+x . 35+x DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) |
* 36+x . .. DTLS only: cookie |
* .. . .. ciphersuite list length (2 bytes) |
* .. . .. ciphersuite list |
* .. . .. compression alg. list length (1 byte) |
* .. . .. compression alg. list |
* .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes, optional) |
* .. . .. extensions (optional) |
*/ |
|
/* |
* Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions omitted) is |
* 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can |
* read at least up to session id length without worrying. |
*/ |
if( msg_len < 38 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
/* |
* Check and save the protocol version |
*/ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, version", buf, 2 ); |
|
mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &ssl->major_ver, &ssl->minor_ver, |
ssl->conf->transport, buf ); |
|
ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = ssl->major_ver; |
ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = ssl->minor_ver; |
|
if( ssl->major_ver < ssl->conf->min_major_ver || |
ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client only supports ssl smaller than minimum" |
" [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", |
ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, |
ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); |
} |
|
if( ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver ) |
{ |
ssl->major_ver = ssl->conf->max_major_ver; |
ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; |
} |
else if( ssl->minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) |
ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; |
|
/* |
* Save client random (inc. Unix time) |
*/ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32 ); |
|
memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32 ); |
|
/* |
* Check the session ID length and save session ID |
*/ |
sess_len = buf[34]; |
|
if( sess_len > sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) || |
sess_len + 34 + 2 > msg_len ) /* 2 for cipherlist length field */ |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", buf + 35, sess_len ); |
|
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len; |
memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, |
sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) ); |
memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, |
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); |
|
/* |
* Check the cookie length and content |
*/ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) |
{ |
cookie_offset = 35 + sess_len; |
cookie_len = buf[cookie_offset]; |
|
if( cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len + 2 > msg_len ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, cookie", |
buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len ); |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) |
if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_check != NULL |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
&& ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE |
#endif |
) |
{ |
if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_check( ssl->conf->p_cookie, |
buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len, |
ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification failed" ) ); |
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 1; |
} |
else |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification passed" ) ); |
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0; |
} |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ |
{ |
/* We know we didn't send a cookie, so it should be empty */ |
if( cookie_len != 0 ) |
{ |
/* This may be an attacker's probe, so don't send an alert */ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification skipped" ) ); |
} |
|
/* |
* Check the ciphersuitelist length (will be parsed later) |
*/ |
ciph_offset = cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len; |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ |
ciph_offset = 35 + sess_len; |
|
ciph_len = ( buf[ciph_offset + 0] << 8 ) |
| ( buf[ciph_offset + 1] ); |
|
if( ciph_len < 2 || |
ciph_len + 2 + ciph_offset + 1 > msg_len || /* 1 for comp. alg. len */ |
( ciph_len % 2 ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", |
buf + ciph_offset + 2, ciph_len ); |
|
/* |
* Check the compression algorithms length and pick one |
*/ |
comp_offset = ciph_offset + 2 + ciph_len; |
|
comp_len = buf[comp_offset]; |
|
if( comp_len < 1 || |
comp_len > 16 || |
comp_len + comp_offset + 1 > msg_len ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, compression", |
buf + comp_offset + 1, comp_len ); |
|
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) |
for( i = 0; i < comp_len; ++i ) |
{ |
if( buf[comp_offset + 1 + i] == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) |
{ |
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE; |
break; |
} |
} |
#endif |
|
/* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) |
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; |
#endif |
|
/* Do not parse the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) |
if( ( ssl->major_ver != 3 ) || ( ssl->minor_ver != 0 ) ) |
{ |
#endif |
/* |
* Check the extension length |
*/ |
ext_offset = comp_offset + 1 + comp_len; |
if( msg_len > ext_offset ) |
{ |
if( msg_len < ext_offset + 2 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
ext_len = ( buf[ext_offset + 0] << 8 ) |
| ( buf[ext_offset + 1] ); |
|
if( ( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) || |
msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
} |
else |
ext_len = 0; |
|
ext = buf + ext_offset + 2; |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello extensions", ext, ext_len ); |
|
while( ext_len != 0 ) |
{ |
unsigned int ext_id; |
unsigned int ext_size; |
if ( ext_len < 4 ) { |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
ext_id = ( ( ext[0] << 8 ) | ( ext[1] ) ); |
ext_size = ( ( ext[2] << 8 ) | ( ext[3] ) ); |
|
if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
switch( ext_id ) |
{ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) |
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ServerName extension" ) ); |
if( ssl->conf->f_sni == NULL ) |
break; |
|
ret = ssl_parse_servername_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
break; |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ |
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found renegotiation extension" ) ); |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
renegotiation_info_seen = 1; |
#endif |
|
ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
break; |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) |
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found signature_algorithms extension" ) ); |
|
ret = ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
|
sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 1; |
break; |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && |
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported elliptic curves extension" ) ); |
|
ret = ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
break; |
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported point formats extension" ) ); |
ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT; |
|
ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
break; |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || |
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ecjpake kkpp extension" ) ); |
|
ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
break; |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) |
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found max fragment length extension" ) ); |
|
ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
break; |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) |
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found truncated hmac extension" ) ); |
|
ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
break; |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) |
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found encrypt then mac extension" ) ); |
|
ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
break; |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) |
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found extended master secret extension" ) ); |
|
ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
break; |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found session ticket extension" ) ); |
|
ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
break; |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) |
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) ); |
|
ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
break; |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
|
default: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %d (ignoring)", |
ext_id ) ); |
} |
|
ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; |
ext += 4 + ext_size; |
|
if( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
} |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) |
} |
#endif |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) |
for( i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2 ) |
{ |
if( p[0] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE >> 8 ) & 0xff ) && |
p[1] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) & 0xff ) ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); |
|
if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inapropriate fallback" ) ); |
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK ); |
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
break; |
} |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) |
|
/* |
* Try to fall back to default hash SHA1 if the client |
* hasn't provided any preferred signature-hash combinations. |
*/ |
if( sig_hash_alg_ext_present == 0 ) |
{ |
mbedtls_md_type_t md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; |
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, md_default ) != 0 ) |
md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; |
|
mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, md_default ); |
} |
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && |
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ |
|
/* |
* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV |
*/ |
for( i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2 ) |
{ |
if( p[0] == 0 && p[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO " ) ); |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received RENEGOTIATION SCSV " |
"during renegotiation" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
#endif |
ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; |
break; |
} |
} |
|
/* |
* Renegotiation security checks |
*/ |
if( ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && |
ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) ); |
handshake_failure = 1; |
} |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && |
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && |
renegotiation_info_seen == 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) ); |
handshake_failure = 1; |
} |
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && |
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && |
ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation not allowed" ) ); |
handshake_failure = 1; |
} |
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && |
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && |
renegotiation_info_seen == 1 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) ); |
handshake_failure = 1; |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ |
|
if( handshake_failure == 1 ) |
{ |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
} |
|
/* |
* Search for a matching ciphersuite |
* (At the end because we need information from the EC-based extensions |
* and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension.) |
*/ |
got_common_suite = 0; |
ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; |
ciphersuite_info = NULL; |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) |
for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 ) |
for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) |
#else |
for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) |
for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 ) |
#endif |
{ |
if( p[0] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) || |
p[1] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] ) & 0xFF ) ) |
continue; |
|
got_common_suite = 1; |
|
if( ( ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match( ssl, ciphersuites[i], |
&ciphersuite_info ) ) != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
|
if( ciphersuite_info != NULL ) |
goto have_ciphersuite; |
} |
|
if( got_common_suite ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got ciphersuites in common, " |
"but none of them usable" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE ); |
} |
else |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no ciphersuites in common" ) ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN ); |
} |
|
have_ciphersuite: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name ) ); |
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; |
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; |
|
ssl->state++; |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) |
mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl ); |
#endif |
|
/* Debugging-only output for testsuite */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) |
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) |
{ |
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( ciphersuite_info ); |
if( sig_alg != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) |
{ |
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, |
sig_alg ); |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %d", |
mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( md_alg ) ) ); |
} |
else |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no hash algorithm for signature algorithm " |
"%d - should not happen", sig_alg ) ); |
} |
} |
#endif |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client hello" ) ); |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) |
static void ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
unsigned char *buf, |
size_t *olen ) |
{ |
unsigned char *p = buf; |
|
if( ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED ) |
{ |
*olen = 0; |
return; |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding truncated hmac extension" ) ); |
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC ) & 0xFF ); |
|
*p++ = 0x00; |
*p++ = 0x00; |
|
*olen = 4; |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) |
static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
unsigned char *buf, |
size_t *olen ) |
{ |
unsigned char *p = buf; |
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = NULL; |
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher = NULL; |
|
if( ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED || |
ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) |
{ |
*olen = 0; |
return; |
} |
|
/* |
* RFC 7366: "If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension |
* from a client and then selects a stream or Authenticated Encryption |
* with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an |
* encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the client." |
*/ |
if( ( suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( |
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) == NULL || |
( cipher = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( suite->cipher ) ) == NULL || |
cipher->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) |
{ |
*olen = 0; |
return; |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension" ) ); |
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC ) & 0xFF ); |
|
*p++ = 0x00; |
*p++ = 0x00; |
|
*olen = 4; |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) |
static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
unsigned char *buf, |
size_t *olen ) |
{ |
unsigned char *p = buf; |
|
if( ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || |
ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) |
{ |
*olen = 0; |
return; |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding extended master secret " |
"extension" ) ); |
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET ) & 0xFF ); |
|
*p++ = 0x00; |
*p++ = 0x00; |
|
*olen = 4; |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
unsigned char *buf, |
size_t *olen ) |
{ |
unsigned char *p = buf; |
|
if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket == 0 ) |
{ |
*olen = 0; |
return; |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding session ticket extension" ) ); |
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET ) & 0xFF ); |
|
*p++ = 0x00; |
*p++ = 0x00; |
|
*olen = 4; |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
|
static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
unsigned char *buf, |
size_t *olen ) |
{ |
unsigned char *p = buf; |
|
if( ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ) |
{ |
*olen = 0; |
return; |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" ) ); |
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) & 0xFF ); |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) |
{ |
*p++ = 0x00; |
*p++ = ( ssl->verify_data_len * 2 + 1 ) & 0xFF; |
*p++ = ssl->verify_data_len * 2 & 0xFF; |
|
memcpy( p, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ); |
p += ssl->verify_data_len; |
memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ); |
p += ssl->verify_data_len; |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ |
{ |
*p++ = 0x00; |
*p++ = 0x01; |
*p++ = 0x00; |
} |
|
*olen = p - buf; |
} |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) |
static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
unsigned char *buf, |
size_t *olen ) |
{ |
unsigned char *p = buf; |
|
if( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ) |
{ |
*olen = 0; |
return; |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" ) ); |
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH ) & 0xFF ); |
|
*p++ = 0x00; |
*p++ = 1; |
|
*p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code; |
|
*olen = 5; |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
unsigned char *buf, |
size_t *olen ) |
{ |
unsigned char *p = buf; |
((void) ssl); |
|
if( ( ssl->handshake->cli_exts & |
MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT ) == 0 ) |
{ |
*olen = 0; |
return; |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, supported_point_formats extension" ) ); |
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS ) & 0xFF ); |
|
*p++ = 0x00; |
*p++ = 2; |
|
*p++ = 1; |
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; |
|
*olen = 6; |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
unsigned char *buf, |
size_t *olen ) |
{ |
int ret; |
unsigned char *p = buf; |
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; |
size_t kkpp_len; |
|
*olen = 0; |
|
/* Skip costly computation if not needed */ |
if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != |
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) |
return; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, ecjpake kkpp extension" ) ); |
|
if( end - p < 4 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); |
return; |
} |
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP ) & 0xFF ); |
|
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, |
p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, |
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret ); |
return; |
} |
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( kkpp_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( kkpp_len ) & 0xFF ); |
|
*olen = kkpp_len + 4; |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN ) |
static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen ) |
{ |
if( ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL ) |
{ |
*olen = 0; |
return; |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding alpn extension" ) ); |
|
/* |
* 0 . 1 ext identifier |
* 2 . 3 ext length |
* 4 . 5 protocol list length |
* 6 . 6 protocol name length |
* 7 . 7+n protocol name |
*/ |
buf[0] = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
buf[1] = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN ) & 0xFF ); |
|
*olen = 7 + strlen( ssl->alpn_chosen ); |
|
buf[2] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
buf[3] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) ) & 0xFF ); |
|
buf[4] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
buf[5] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) ) & 0xFF ); |
|
buf[6] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 7 ) ) & 0xFF ); |
|
memcpy( buf + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, *olen - 7 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) |
static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
{ |
int ret; |
unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4; |
unsigned char *cookie_len_byte; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write hello verify request" ) ); |
|
/* |
* struct { |
* ProtocolVersion server_version; |
* opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; |
* } HelloVerifyRequest; |
*/ |
|
/* The RFC is not clear on this point, but sending the actual negotiated |
* version looks like the most interoperable thing to do. */ |
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, |
ssl->conf->transport, p ); |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server version", p, 2 ); |
p += 2; |
|
/* If we get here, f_cookie_check is not null */ |
if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inconsistent cookie callbacks" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
} |
|
/* Skip length byte until we know the length */ |
cookie_len_byte = p++; |
|
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_cookie_write( ssl->conf->p_cookie, |
&p, ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN, |
ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_cookie_write", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
*cookie_len_byte = (unsigned char)( p - ( cookie_len_byte + 1 ) ); |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie sent", cookie_len_byte + 1, *cookie_len_byte ); |
|
ssl->out_msglen = p - ssl->out_msg; |
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; |
|
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT; |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && |
( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write hello verify request" ) ); |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ |
|
static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
{ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) |
mbedtls_time_t t; |
#endif |
int ret; |
size_t olen, ext_len = 0, n; |
unsigned char *buf, *p; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server hello" ) ); |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) |
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && |
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "client hello was not authenticated" ) ); |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello" ) ); |
|
return( ssl_write_hello_verify_request( ssl ) ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ |
|
if( ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no RNG provided") ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG ); |
} |
|
/* |
* 0 . 0 handshake type |
* 1 . 3 handshake length |
* 4 . 5 protocol version |
* 6 . 9 UNIX time() |
* 10 . 37 random bytes |
*/ |
buf = ssl->out_msg; |
p = buf + 4; |
|
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, |
ssl->conf->transport, p ); |
p += 2; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]", |
buf[4], buf[5] ) ); |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) |
t = mbedtls_time( NULL ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 24 ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 16 ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 8 ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t ); |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu", t ) ); |
#else |
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4 ) ) != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
|
p += 4; |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ |
|
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28 ) ) != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
|
p += 28; |
|
memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32 ); |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 6, 32 ); |
|
/* |
* Resume is 0 by default, see ssl_handshake_init(). |
* It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(). |
* If not, try looking up session ID in our cache. |
*/ |
if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 && |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE && |
#endif |
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != 0 && |
ssl->conf->f_get_cache != NULL && |
ssl->conf->f_get_cache( ssl->conf->p_cache, ssl->session_negotiate ) == 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from cache" ) ); |
ssl->handshake->resume = 1; |
} |
|
if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 ) |
{ |
/* |
* New session, create a new session id, |
* unless we're about to issue a session ticket |
*/ |
ssl->state++; |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) |
ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time( NULL ); |
#endif |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 ) |
{ |
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 0; |
memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, 32 ); |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
{ |
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32; |
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, ssl->session_negotiate->id, |
n ) ) != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
} |
} |
else |
{ |
/* |
* Resuming a session |
*/ |
n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; |
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
} |
|
/* |
* 38 . 38 session id length |
* 39 . 38+n session id |
* 39+n . 40+n chosen ciphersuite |
* 41+n . 41+n chosen compression alg. |
* 42+n . 43+n extensions length |
* 44+n . 43+n+m extensions |
*/ |
*p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; |
memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); |
p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %d", n ) ); |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 39, n ); |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed", |
ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) ); |
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite >> 8 ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ssl->session_negotiate->compression ); |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", |
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) ); |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X", |
ssl->session_negotiate->compression ) ); |
|
/* Do not write the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) |
if( ( ssl->major_ver != 3 ) || ( ssl->minor_ver != 0 ) ) |
{ |
#endif |
|
/* |
* First write extensions, then the total length |
*/ |
ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
ext_len += olen; |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) |
ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
ext_len += olen; |
#endif |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) |
ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
ext_len += olen; |
#endif |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) |
ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
ext_len += olen; |
#endif |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) |
ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
ext_len += olen; |
#endif |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
ext_len += olen; |
#endif |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
if ( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( |
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) ) |
{ |
ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
ext_len += olen; |
} |
#endif |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
ext_len += olen; |
#endif |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) |
ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
ext_len += olen; |
#endif |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, total extension length: %d", ext_len ) ); |
|
if( ext_len > 0 ) |
{ |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len ) & 0xFF ); |
p += ext_len; |
} |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) |
} |
#endif |
|
ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; |
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO; |
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ); |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello" ) ); |
|
return( ret ); |
} |
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ |
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ |
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ |
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ |
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)&& \ |
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) |
static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
{ |
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = |
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate request" ) ); |
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) ); |
ssl->state++; |
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
} |
#else |
static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
{ |
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = |
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; |
size_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */ |
size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */ |
unsigned char *buf, *p; |
const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; |
const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; |
int authmode; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate request" ) ); |
|
ssl->state++; |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) |
if( ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET ) |
authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode; |
else |
#endif |
authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; |
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE || |
authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) ); |
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
/* |
* 0 . 0 handshake type |
* 1 . 3 handshake length |
* 4 . 4 cert type count |
* 5 .. m-1 cert types |
* m .. m+1 sig alg length (TLS 1.2 only) |
* m+1 .. n-1 SignatureAndHashAlgorithms (TLS 1.2 only) |
* n .. n+1 length of all DNs |
* n+2 .. n+3 length of DN 1 |
* n+4 .. ... Distinguished Name #1 |
* ... .. ... length of DN 2, etc. |
*/ |
buf = ssl->out_msg; |
p = buf + 4; |
|
/* |
* Supported certificate types |
* |
* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>; |
* enum { (255) } ClientCertificateType; |
*/ |
ct_len = 0; |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) |
p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN; |
#endif |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) |
p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN; |
#endif |
|
p[0] = (unsigned char) ct_len++; |
p += ct_len; |
|
sa_len = 0; |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) |
/* |
* Add signature_algorithms for verify (TLS 1.2) |
* |
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; |
* |
* struct { |
* HashAlgorithm hash; |
* SignatureAlgorithm signature; |
* } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; |
* |
* enum { (255) } HashAlgorithm; |
* enum { (255) } SignatureAlgorithm; |
*/ |
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) |
{ |
const int *cur; |
|
/* |
* Supported signature algorithms |
*/ |
for( cur = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *cur != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; cur++ ) |
{ |
unsigned char hash = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( *cur ); |
|
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE == hash || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( ssl, hash ) ) |
continue; |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) |
p[2 + sa_len++] = hash; |
p[2 + sa_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; |
#endif |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) |
p[2 + sa_len++] = hash; |
p[2 + sa_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; |
#endif |
} |
|
p[0] = (unsigned char)( sa_len >> 8 ); |
p[1] = (unsigned char)( sa_len ); |
sa_len += 2; |
p += sa_len; |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ |
|
/* |
* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; |
* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>; |
*/ |
p += 2; |
|
total_dn_size = 0; |
|
if( ssl->conf->cert_req_ca_list == MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED ) |
{ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) |
if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL ) |
crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; |
else |
#endif |
crt = ssl->conf->ca_chain; |
|
while( crt != NULL && crt->version != 0 ) |
{ |
dn_size = crt->subject_raw.len; |
|
if( end < p || |
(size_t)( end - p ) < dn_size || |
(size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) ); |
break; |
} |
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size >> 8 ); |
*p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size ); |
memcpy( p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size ); |
p += dn_size; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size ); |
|
total_dn_size += 2 + dn_size; |
crt = crt->next; |
} |
} |
|
ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; |
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; |
ssl->out_msg[4 + ct_len + sa_len] = (unsigned char)( total_dn_size >> 8 ); |
ssl->out_msg[5 + ct_len + sa_len] = (unsigned char)( total_dn_size ); |
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ); |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate request" ) ); |
|
return( ret ); |
} |
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED && |
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED && |
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED && |
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED && |
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED && |
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) |
static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
{ |
int ret; |
|
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); |
} |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
mbedtls_pk_ec( *mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) ), |
MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_get_params" ), ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || |
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) && \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
size_t *signature_len ) |
{ |
/* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the |
* signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange |
* after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange. |
* ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing |
* ssl->out_msglen. */ |
unsigned char *sig_start = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2; |
size_t sig_max_len = ( ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN |
- sig_start ); |
int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume( ssl, |
sig_start, signature_len, sig_max_len ); |
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ) |
{ |
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0; |
mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( ssl, NULL ); |
} |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_resume_server_key_exchange", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) && |
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */ |
|
/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message, up to and including |
* calculating the signature if any, but excluding formatting the |
* signature and sending the message. */ |
static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
size_t *signature_len ) |
{ |
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = |
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_PFS__ENABLED) |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) |
unsigned char *dig_signed = NULL; |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_PFS__ENABLED */ |
|
(void) ciphersuite_info; /* unused in some configurations */ |
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) |
(void) signature_len; |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ |
|
ssl->out_msglen = 4; /* header (type:1, length:3) to be written later */ |
|
/* |
* |
* Part 1: Provide key exchange parameters for chosen ciphersuite. |
* |
*/ |
|
/* |
* - ECJPAKE key exchanges |
*/ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) |
{ |
int ret; |
size_t len = 0; |
|
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( |
&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, |
ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, &len, |
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
ssl->out_msglen += len; |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
|
/* |
* For (EC)DHE key exchanges with PSK, parameters are prefixed by support |
* identity hint (RFC 4279, Sec. 3). Until someone needs this feature, |
* we use empty support identity hints here. |
**/ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) |
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) |
{ |
ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00; |
ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00; |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED || |
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ |
|
/* |
* - DHE key exchanges |
*/ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED) |
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe( ciphersuite_info ) ) |
{ |
int ret; |
size_t len = 0; |
|
if( ssl->conf->dhm_P.p == NULL || ssl->conf->dhm_G.p == NULL ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no DH parameters set" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
} |
|
/* |
* Ephemeral DH parameters: |
* |
* struct { |
* opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>; |
* opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>; |
* opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>; |
* } ServerDHParams; |
*/ |
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_set_group( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, |
&ssl->conf->dhm_P, |
&ssl->conf->dhm_G ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_set_group", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_params( |
&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, |
(int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ), |
ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, &len, |
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_params", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) |
dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; |
#endif |
|
ssl->out_msglen += len; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X ); |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ); |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G ); |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__DHE_ENABLED */ |
|
/* |
* - ECDHE key exchanges |
*/ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED) |
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe( ciphersuite_info ) ) |
{ |
/* |
* Ephemeral ECDH parameters: |
* |
* struct { |
* ECParameters curve_params; |
* ECPoint public; |
* } ServerECDHParams; |
*/ |
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curve = NULL; |
const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid; |
int ret; |
size_t len = 0; |
|
/* Match our preference list against the offered curves */ |
for( gid = ssl->conf->curve_list; *gid != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; gid++ ) |
for( curve = ssl->handshake->curves; *curve != NULL; curve++ ) |
if( (*curve)->grp_id == *gid ) |
goto curve_matching_done; |
|
curve_matching_done: |
if( curve == NULL || *curve == NULL ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no matching curve for ECDHE" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDHE curve: %s", (*curve)->name ) ); |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
(*curve)->grp_id ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecp_group_load", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( |
&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &len, |
ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, |
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_params", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) |
dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; |
#endif |
|
ssl->out_msglen += len; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED */ |
|
/* |
* |
* Part 2: For key exchanges involving the server signing the |
* exchange parameters, compute and add the signature here. |
* |
*/ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) |
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) ) |
{ |
size_t dig_signed_len = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed; |
size_t hashlen = 0; |
unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; |
int ret; |
|
/* |
* 2.1: Choose hash algorithm: |
* A: For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension |
* to choose appropriate hash. |
* B: For SSL3, TLS1.0, TLS1.1 and ECDHE_ECDSA, use SHA1 |
* (RFC 4492, Sec. 5.4) |
* C: Otherwise, use MD5 + SHA1 (RFC 4346, Sec. 7.4.3) |
*/ |
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) |
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = |
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ); |
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) |
{ |
/* A: For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension |
* (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */ |
if( sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE || |
( md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( &ssl->handshake->hash_algs, |
sig_alg ) ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
/* (... because we choose a cipher suite |
* only if there is a matching hash.) */ |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
} |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) |
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) |
{ |
/* B: Default hash SHA1 */ |
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ |
{ |
/* C: MD5 + SHA1 */ |
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "pick hash algorithm %d for signing", md_alg ) ); |
|
/* |
* 2.2: Compute the hash to be signed |
*/ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) |
if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) |
{ |
hashlen = 36; |
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash, |
dig_signed, |
dig_signed_len ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) |
if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) |
{ |
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, &hashlen, |
dig_signed, |
dig_signed_len, |
md_alg ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen ); |
|
/* |
* 2.3: Compute and add the signature |
*/ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) |
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) |
{ |
/* |
* For TLS 1.2, we need to specify signature and hash algorithm |
* explicitly through a prefix to the signature. |
* |
* struct { |
* HashAlgorithm hash; |
* SignatureAlgorithm signature; |
* } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; |
* |
* struct { |
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; |
* opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; |
* } DigitallySigned; |
* |
*/ |
|
ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = |
mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( md_alg ); |
ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = |
mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( sig_alg ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
if( ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL ) |
{ |
ret = ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start( ssl, |
mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ), |
md_alg, hash, hashlen ); |
switch( ret ) |
{ |
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH: |
/* act as if f_async_sign was null */ |
break; |
case 0: |
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; |
return( ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( ssl, signature_len ) ); |
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS: |
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ); |
default: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_async_sign_start", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ |
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) == NULL ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); |
} |
|
/* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the |
* signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange |
* after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange. |
* ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing |
* ssl->out_msglen. */ |
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), |
md_alg, hash, hashlen, |
ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2, |
signature_len, |
ssl->conf->f_rng, |
ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message and send it. For ciphersuites |
* that do not include a ServerKeyExchange message, do nothing. Either |
* way, if successful, move on to the next step in the SSL state |
* machine. */ |
static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
{ |
int ret; |
size_t signature_len = 0; |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED) |
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = |
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED */ |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server key exchange" ) ); |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED) |
/* Extract static ECDH parameters and abort if ServerKeyExchange |
* is not needed. */ |
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs( ciphersuite_info ) ) |
{ |
/* For suites involving ECDH, extract DH parameters |
* from certificate at this point. */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED) |
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh( ciphersuite_info ) ) |
{ |
ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDH_ENABLED */ |
|
/* Key exchanges not involving ephemeral keys don't use |
* ServerKeyExchange, so end here. */ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write server key exchange" ) ); |
ssl->state++; |
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME_NON_PFS__ENABLED */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) && \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
/* If we have already prepared the message and there is an ongoing |
* signature operation, resume signing. */ |
if( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "resuming signature operation" ) ); |
ret = ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( ssl, &signature_len ); |
} |
else |
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) && |
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */ |
{ |
/* ServerKeyExchange is needed. Prepare the message. */ |
ret = ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( ssl, &signature_len ); |
} |
|
if( ret != 0 ) |
{ |
/* If we're starting to write a new message, set ssl->out_msglen |
* to 0. But if we're resuming after an asynchronous message, |
* out_msglen is the amount of data written so far and mst be |
* preserved. */ |
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ) |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server key exchange (pending)" ) ); |
else |
ssl->out_msglen = 0; |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
/* If there is a signature, write its length. |
* ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange already wrote the signature |
* itself at its proper place in the output buffer. */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) |
if( signature_len != 0 ) |
{ |
ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = (unsigned char)( signature_len >> 8 ); |
ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = (unsigned char)( signature_len ); |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "my signature", |
ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, |
signature_len ); |
|
/* Skip over the already-written signature */ |
ssl->out_msglen += signature_len; |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */ |
|
/* Add header and send. */ |
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; |
|
ssl->state++; |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server key exchange" ) ); |
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
static int ssl_write_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
{ |
int ret; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server hello done" ) ); |
|
ssl->out_msglen = 4; |
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE; |
|
ssl->state++; |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) |
mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl ); |
#endif |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && |
( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello done" ) ); |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) |
static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, |
const unsigned char *end ) |
{ |
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
size_t n; |
|
/* |
* Receive G^Y mod P, premaster = (G^Y)^X mod P |
*/ |
if( *p + 2 > end ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
} |
|
n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1]; |
*p += 2; |
|
if( *p + n > end ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
} |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, *p, n ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_read_public", ret ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP ); |
} |
|
*p += n; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY ); |
|
return( ret ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || |
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
static int ssl_resume_decrypt_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
unsigned char *peer_pms, |
size_t *peer_pmslen, |
size_t peer_pmssize ) |
{ |
int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume( ssl, |
peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize ); |
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ) |
{ |
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0; |
mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( ssl, NULL ); |
} |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ |
|
static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
const unsigned char *p, |
const unsigned char *end, |
unsigned char *peer_pms, |
size_t *peer_pmslen, |
size_t peer_pmssize ) |
{ |
int ret; |
mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ); |
mbedtls_pk_context *public_key = &mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl )->pk; |
size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len( public_key ); |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
/* If we have already started decoding the message and there is an ongoing |
* decryption operation, resume signing. */ |
if( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "resuming decryption operation" ) ); |
return( ssl_resume_decrypt_pms( ssl, |
peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize ) ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ |
|
/* |
* Prepare to decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key |
*/ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) |
if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) |
{ |
if ( p + 2 > end ) { |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
} |
if( *p++ != ( ( len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) || |
*p++ != ( ( len ) & 0xFF ) ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
} |
} |
#endif |
|
if( p + len != end ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
} |
|
/* |
* Decrypt the premaster secret |
*/ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
if( ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL ) |
{ |
ret = ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start( ssl, |
mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ), |
p, len ); |
switch( ret ) |
{ |
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH: |
/* act as if f_async_decrypt_start was null */ |
break; |
case 0: |
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; |
return( ssl_resume_decrypt_pms( ssl, |
peer_pms, |
peer_pmslen, |
peer_pmssize ) ); |
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS: |
ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ); |
default: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_async_decrypt_start", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ |
|
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no RSA private key" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); |
} |
|
ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt( private_key, p, len, |
peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize, |
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
const unsigned char *p, |
const unsigned char *end, |
size_t pms_offset ) |
{ |
int ret; |
unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; |
unsigned char ver[2]; |
unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48]; |
unsigned char mask; |
size_t i, peer_pmslen; |
unsigned int diff; |
|
/* In case of a failure in decryption, the decryption may write less than |
* 2 bytes of output, but we always read the first two bytes. It doesn't |
* matter in the end because diff will be nonzero in that case due to |
* peer_pmslen being less than 48, and we only care whether diff is 0. |
* But do initialize peer_pms for robustness anyway. This also makes |
* memory analyzers happy (don't access uninitialized memory, even |
* if it's an unsigned char). */ |
peer_pms[0] = peer_pms[1] = ~0; |
|
ret = ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, |
peer_pms, |
&peer_pmslen, |
sizeof( peer_pms ) ); |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
if ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS ) |
return( ret ); |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ |
|
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->handshake->max_major_ver, |
ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver, |
ssl->conf->transport, ver ); |
|
/* Avoid data-dependent branches while checking for invalid |
* padding, to protect against timing-based Bleichenbacher-type |
* attacks. */ |
diff = (unsigned int) ret; |
diff |= peer_pmslen ^ 48; |
diff |= peer_pms[0] ^ ver[0]; |
diff |= peer_pms[1] ^ ver[1]; |
|
/* mask = diff ? 0xff : 0x00 using bit operations to avoid branches */ |
/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is |
* well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ |
#if defined(_MSC_VER) |
#pragma warning( push ) |
#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) |
#endif |
mask = - ( ( diff | - diff ) >> ( sizeof( unsigned int ) * 8 - 1 ) ); |
#if defined(_MSC_VER) |
#pragma warning( pop ) |
#endif |
|
/* |
* Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding |
* must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a |
* bad_record_mac later in the handshake. |
* To protect against timing-based variants of the attack, we must |
* not have any branch that depends on whether the decryption was |
* successful. In particular, always generate the fake premaster secret, |
* regardless of whether it will ultimately influence the output or not. |
*/ |
ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, fake_pms, sizeof( fake_pms ) ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
{ |
/* It's ok to abort on an RNG failure, since this does not reveal |
* anything about the RSA decryption. */ |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) |
if( diff != 0 ) |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
#endif |
|
if( sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) < pms_offset || |
sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) - pms_offset < 48 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
} |
ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48; |
|
/* Set pms to either the true or the fake PMS, without |
* data-dependent branches. */ |
for( i = 0; i < ssl->handshake->pmslen; i++ ) |
pms[i] = ( mask & fake_pms[i] ) | ( (~mask) & peer_pms[i] ); |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || |
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) |
static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, |
const unsigned char *end ) |
{ |
int ret = 0; |
size_t n; |
|
if( ssl->conf->f_psk == NULL && |
( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL || |
ssl->conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || ssl->conf->psk_len == 0 ) ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no pre-shared key" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); |
} |
|
/* |
* Receive client pre-shared key identity name |
*/ |
if( end - *p < 2 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
} |
|
n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1]; |
*p += 2; |
|
if( n < 1 || n > 65535 || n > (size_t) ( end - *p ) ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
} |
|
if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL ) |
{ |
if( ssl->conf->f_psk( ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, *p, n ) != 0 ) |
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; |
} |
else |
{ |
/* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear, |
* but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */ |
if( n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len || |
mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 ) |
{ |
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; |
} |
} |
|
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Unknown PSK identity", *p, n ); |
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY ); |
} |
|
*p += n; |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ |
|
static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
{ |
int ret; |
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; |
unsigned char *p, *end; |
|
ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client key exchange" ) ); |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) && \ |
( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) ) |
if( ( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA ) && |
( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) ) |
{ |
/* We've already read a record and there is an asynchronous |
* operation in progress to decrypt it. So skip reading the |
* record. */ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "will resume decryption of previously-read record" ) ); |
} |
else |
#endif |
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); |
end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen; |
|
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
} |
|
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
} |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) |
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ) |
{ |
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_dh_public" ), ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
if( p != end ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
} |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, |
ssl->handshake->premaster, |
MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE, |
&ssl->handshake->pmslen, |
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K ); |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) |
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA ) |
{ |
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
p, end - p) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP ); |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
&ssl->handshake->pmslen, |
ssl->handshake->premaster, |
MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, |
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z ); |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || |
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || |
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || |
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) |
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ) |
{ |
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
if( p != end ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
} |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) |
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) |
{ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) |
if ( ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0 ) |
{ |
/* There is an asynchronous operation in progress to |
* decrypt the encrypted premaster secret, so skip |
* directly to resuming this operation. */ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "PSK identity already parsed" ) ); |
/* Update p to skip the PSK identity. ssl_parse_encrypted_pms |
* won't actually use it, but maintain p anyway for robustness. */ |
p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len + 2; |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ |
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, 2 ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_encrypted_pms" ), ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) |
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) |
{ |
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_dh_public" ), ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
if( p != end ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
} |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) |
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) |
{ |
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
p, end - p ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP ); |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) |
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA ) |
{ |
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, 0 ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_parse_encrypted_pms_secret" ), ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) |
{ |
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, |
p, end - p ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
} |
|
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, |
ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen, |
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); |
if( ret != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
} |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
ssl->state++; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client key exchange" ) ); |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ |
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ |
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ |
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ |
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)&& \ |
!defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) |
static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
{ |
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = |
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) ); |
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); |
ssl->state++; |
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
} |
#else |
static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
{ |
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
size_t i, sig_len; |
unsigned char hash[48]; |
unsigned char *hash_start = hash; |
size_t hashlen; |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) |
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; |
#endif |
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; |
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = |
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) ); |
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || |
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE || |
ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); |
ssl->state++; |
return( 0 ); |
} |
|
/* Read the message without adding it to the checksum */ |
ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 0 /* no checksum update */ ); |
if( 0 != ret ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_read_record" ), ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
ssl->state++; |
|
/* Process the message contents */ |
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || |
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); |
} |
|
i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); |
|
/* |
* struct { |
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; -- TLS 1.2 only |
* opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; |
* } DigitallySigned; |
*/ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ |
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) |
if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) |
{ |
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; |
hashlen = 36; |
|
/* For ECDSA, use SHA-1, not MD-5 + SHA-1 */ |
if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, |
MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) |
{ |
hash_start += 16; |
hashlen -= 16; |
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; |
} |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || |
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) |
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) |
{ |
if( i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); |
} |
|
/* |
* Hash |
*/ |
md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( ssl->in_msg[i] ); |
|
if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( ssl, ssl->in_msg[i] ) ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" |
" for verify message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); |
} |
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) |
if( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 == md_alg ) |
hash_start += 16; |
#endif |
|
/* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ |
hashlen = 0; |
|
i++; |
|
/* |
* Signature |
*/ |
if( ( pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( ssl->in_msg[i] ) ) |
== MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" |
" for verify message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); |
} |
|
/* |
* Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg |
*/ |
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, pk_alg ) ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sig_alg doesn't match cert key" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); |
} |
|
i++; |
} |
else |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
} |
|
if( i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); |
} |
|
sig_len = ( ssl->in_msg[i] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[i+1]; |
i += 2; |
|
if( i + sig_len != ssl->in_hslen ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); |
} |
|
/* Calculate hash and verify signature */ |
ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash ); |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, |
md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, |
ssl->in_msg + i, sig_len ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl ); |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate verify" ) ); |
|
return( ret ); |
} |
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED && |
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED && |
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED && |
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED && |
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED && |
!MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
{ |
int ret; |
size_t tlen; |
uint32_t lifetime; |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write new session ticket" ) ); |
|
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; |
|
/* |
* struct { |
* uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint; |
* opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>; |
* } NewSessionTicket; |
* |
* 4 . 7 ticket_lifetime_hint (0 = unspecified) |
* 8 . 9 ticket_len (n) |
* 10 . 9+n ticket content |
*/ |
|
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write( ssl->conf->p_ticket, |
ssl->session_negotiate, |
ssl->out_msg + 10, |
ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, |
&tlen, &lifetime ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write", ret ); |
tlen = 0; |
} |
|
ssl->out_msg[4] = ( lifetime >> 24 ) & 0xFF; |
ssl->out_msg[5] = ( lifetime >> 16 ) & 0xFF; |
ssl->out_msg[6] = ( lifetime >> 8 ) & 0xFF; |
ssl->out_msg[7] = ( lifetime ) & 0xFF; |
|
ssl->out_msg[8] = (unsigned char)( ( tlen >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
ssl->out_msg[9] = (unsigned char)( ( tlen ) & 0xFF ); |
|
ssl->out_msglen = 10 + tlen; |
|
/* |
* Morally equivalent to updating ssl->state, but NewSessionTicket and |
* ChangeCipherSpec share the same state. |
*/ |
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
{ |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret ); |
return( ret ); |
} |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write new session ticket" ) ); |
|
return( 0 ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
|
/* |
* SSL handshake -- server side -- single step |
*/ |
int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
{ |
int ret = 0; |
|
if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL ) |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "server state: %d", ssl->state ) ); |
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && |
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) |
{ |
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
return( ret ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ |
|
switch( ssl->state ) |
{ |
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: |
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; |
break; |
|
/* |
* <== ClientHello |
*/ |
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: |
ret = ssl_parse_client_hello( ssl ); |
break; |
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT: |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); |
#endif |
|
/* |
* ==> ServerHello |
* Certificate |
* ( ServerKeyExchange ) |
* ( CertificateRequest ) |
* ServerHelloDone |
*/ |
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: |
ret = ssl_write_server_hello( ssl ); |
break; |
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: |
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( ssl ); |
break; |
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: |
ret = ssl_write_server_key_exchange( ssl ); |
break; |
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: |
ret = ssl_write_certificate_request( ssl ); |
break; |
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: |
ret = ssl_write_server_hello_done( ssl ); |
break; |
|
/* |
* <== ( Certificate/Alert ) |
* ClientKeyExchange |
* ( CertificateVerify ) |
* ChangeCipherSpec |
* Finished |
*/ |
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: |
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( ssl ); |
break; |
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: |
ret = ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( ssl ); |
break; |
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: |
ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify( ssl ); |
break; |
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: |
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( ssl ); |
break; |
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: |
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( ssl ); |
break; |
|
/* |
* ==> ( NewSessionTicket ) |
* ChangeCipherSpec |
* Finished |
*/ |
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: |
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 ) |
ret = ssl_write_new_session_ticket( ssl ); |
else |
#endif |
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl ); |
break; |
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: |
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( ssl ); |
break; |
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "handshake: done" ) ); |
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; |
break; |
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: |
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( ssl ); |
break; |
|
default: |
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid state %d", ssl->state ) ); |
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
} |
|
return( ret ); |
} |
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ |